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Strategic communication of EU affairs: an analysis of
legislative behaviour on Twitter
Resul Umit
ABSTRACT
An influential literature underlines how much parliamentary communication of
European Union (EU) affairs could offer to democracy in the EU. Yet members of
parliaments (MPs) seem unmoved by their potential. MPs are strategic about
their communication, and this study questions the suitability of EU affairs to
their re-election strategies. Analysing the messages posted on Twitter by
regional and national MPs from Ireland and the United Kingdom over a four-
month period, this article shows that clear electoral safety and strong political
responsibility increase the communication of EU affairs. This suggests that the
low electoral benefits and the high political complexity of EU affairs are
significant deterrents to parliamentary communication of these affairs. As a
result, the voices of Eurosceptic MPs echo disproportionately louder on Twitter.
KEYWORDS Members of parliaments; communication; European Union; text analysis; Twitter
Introduction
Involvement of parliaments in European Union (EU) affairs is often seen as
the most likely remedy for the so-called problem of democratic deficit in
the EU. This requires parliaments to fulfil their representational functions
accordingly, and among others, for example, inform their citizens about EU
affairs. Indeed, a recent but influential literature emphasises how much Eur-
opeanisation of parliamentary communication could offer to democracy in
the EU (Auel, 2007; Auel & Raunio, 2014b; Rauh, 2015; Raunio, 2011).
Early empirical evidence, however, shows that parliaments do not live up to
this potential (Auel, 2015; Auel & Raunio, 2014a; Saalfeld, 2003). This
raises the question of how parliamentary communication of EU affairs, or
lack thereof, can be explained. What provides members of parliaments
(MPs) the incentives for, or holds them back from, communicating EU
affairs? These questions are central to understanding the communication
function of parliaments in the EU, but the determinants of individual legisla-
tive behaviour have never been analysed in this context before.
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This article examines the communicative behaviour of regional and
national MPs. To be able to explain parliamentary communication of EU
affairs, we need to go beyond parties and national parliaments, where the
existing literature stops (for overviews, see Ladrech, 2009; Rozenberg & Heff-
tler, 2015; Winzen, 2010), and analyse the behaviour of individual MPs who
make up these institutions. Regional and national MPs may not be the repre-
sentatives legislating EU affairs, but the discursive aspects of representation –
as rekindled by recent theories of political representation (Mansbridge, 2003,
2004; Saward, 2010; Urbinati, 2006) – require communication and not necess-
arily legislation. Therefore, their involvement in the communication of EU
affairs could be an important step towards democratising the supranational
entity because ‘if MPs raise European issues, they offer a remedy to the other-
wise opaque procedures, the overwhelming complexity, and the difficult attri-
bution of political responsibility in decision-making beyond the nation state’
(Rauh, 2015, p. 118).
Nevertheless, the underlying incentive behind the legislative behaviour of
communication is not what it could offer to society, but rather what it could
offer to the legislators themselves. MPs communicate with their citizens not
only because it builds trust and creates legitimacy (Fenno, 1978) but also
because it helps them get re-elected (Mayhew, 1974). Thus, how much MPs
communicate depends on their re-election strategies, and so does the choice
of which political affairs to communicate. Specifically, I theorise that MPs
will not communicate EU affairs unless it suits their re-election prospects.
Besides extending the empirical evidence to include individual MPs, this
study contributes to the literature in two further ways. I analysed 414,490
messages posted on Twitter by regional as well as national MPs from Ireland
and the UK between 1 October 2014 and 31 January 2015. First, this breaks
the complete dependence on formal channels of communication as a data
source. Because communication channels have their own working logics
(De Wilde, 2014), it is a methodological necessity to broaden the literature
to more informal but direct channels such as the social media. While the exist-
ing studies remain limited to plenary debates and parliamentary questions, this
paper provides new evidence from Twitter – a popular social media platform.
As Nagler and Tucker (2015) suggest, Twitter provides us with ‘an unfiltered
look’ into MPs’ strategic choices about what to communicate.
Second, this study introduces the regional level to the literature on parlia-
mentary communication of EU affairs. Existing literature on the Europeani-
sation of parliaments has developed largely over the national parliaments,
leading to the calls for research that does not ignore the subnational level
(see, for example, Carter, 2013). As the regional parliaments with legislative
powers find an increasing recognition within the EU (Abels, 2013), their
role in the multi-level parliamentary system has recently started to attract
some scholars’ attention (see the contributions in Abels & Eppler, 2016).
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However, their involvement in the parliamentary communication of the
supranational affairs is yet to be investigated. Studies in this literature
cannot be complete without taking different levels of parliaments as well as
different channels of communication into account.
The results indicate that issue salience and credibility of MPs affect who
communicates which issues. This suggests that the low electoral benefits
and the high political complexity of EU affairs are significant deterrents to
the parliamentary communication of these affairs. The remainder of the
article proceeds as follows. After a review of the existing literature on parlia-
mentary communication of EU affairs, the theory section details seven
hypotheses based on rational choice models of legislative behaviour. The sub-
sequent section explains the cases, data, and the three-step method of content
analysis. The results section then presents the descriptive analysis and multi-
variate tests of the hypotheses. Finally, the paper concludes with remarks on
why the results of these tests might be politically significant for the EU.
Literature: parliamentary communication of EU affairs
The communication function of parliaments has recently been at the top of
the ‘agenda for future research’ in the area of parliaments in the EU
(Raunio, 2009). Arguing that parliament is a platform to communicate not
only among the representatives but also to the general public, the literature
following this agenda concentrates on plenary debates and parliamentary
questions. Despite an increase in debates on EU affairs over time, the
results generally show a poor communication effort by national parliaments:
according to the latest figures, national parliaments devote less than 2 per cent
of oral questions and around 7 per cent of all plenary time to EU affairs (Auel,
2015).
The majority of empirical evidence portrays a similarly pessimistic outlook
for democratisation through Europeanisation of parliamentary communi-
cation (see the contributions in Auel & Raunio, 2014a). For example, compar-
ing the plenary debates in the national parliaments of four member states
between 2002 and 2010, Auel and Raunio (2014b) show that institutional
and party-related dynamics rule what is debated in the plenary, leaving
very little room to discuss EU affairs on the parliamentary floor. Likewise,
De Ruiter (2014) finds that opposition parties in the UK or the Netherlands
are not making use of the reports from open methods of coordination – a rich
source of critical information on the performance of governments in EU
affairs – to hold the government publicly to account. Besides, studying the
parliamentary questions asked in the French Assemblée Nationale, Navarro
and Brouard (2014) report that the overall proportion of EU-related questions
directed at the French government was in decline at least until 2007. However,
those who study a more recent time period show that parliamentary
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communication of EU affairs has been increasing over time (Rauh, 2015) and
particularly as a result of the eurozone crisis (Auel & Höing, 2015; Puntscher
Riekmann & Wydra, 2013; Wendler, 2014).
On two notable occasions, the literature points to the level of individual
MPs to provide hypothetical explanations for the lack of parliamentary com-
munication of EU affairs. Saalfeld (2003) argues that there are strong disin-
centives for MPs to communicate these affairs because ‘the decision-making
process in the EU tends to combine low levels of issue salience with high
levels of uncertainty about outcomes and responsibilities’ (p. 91). This is
the worst of both worlds – low benefits and high costs – for MPs seeking
re-election with scarce resources. Similarly, Pollak and Slominski (2014)
reason that ‘individual MPs are reluctant to engage in communicating on
Europe as it is neither rewarded by their political party nor considered advan-
tageous in terms of vote winning’ (p. 112). This article provides the first
empirical investigation of these rational-choice assumptions, which remain
untested in the literature. Otherwise, we cannot understand why so few
plenary debates and parliamentary questions are about EU affairs without
examining the strategies that individual MPs develop with regard to EU
affairs.
Theoretical expectations: rational MPs and communication of
EU affairs
The theoretical assumptions of this study stem from the idea that political
actors behave purposefully in pursuit of their preferences (Downs, 1957).
MPs might pursue various goals while in parliament, but these all come
down to one precondition: re-election as an MP (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina,
1987; Epstein, 1967; Mayhew, 1974). Therefore, MPs strategically choose
their actions to secure their re-election. They have to choose, and they have
to do so strategically, because they compete for parliamentary seats under
the constraints of scarce resources and institutional rules.
All the activities that MPs are involved in to win elections necessitate com-
munication with constituents. Mayhew (1974, pp. 49–77) defines three such
activities: advertising (their own name in order to create a positive image
among the electorate); credit claiming (for actual policies that their electorate
benefits from); and position taking (on any issue that might interest their elec-
torate). One could also add blaming as the fourth activity. Because there is a
zero-sum competition for seats, besides cultivating support – by advertising,
credit claiming, and position taking – MPs also blame competitors to make
sure the others risk losing support as a party of their ‘blame management
strategies’ (McGraw, 1991; McGraw, Best, & Timpone, 1995; McGraw,
Timpone, & Bruck, 1993). Re-election strategies may involve one or all of
these activities, but irrespective of their individual choice, constituents need
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to be informed by some form of communication about the MPs’ name, claims,
positions, or blames.
The content of this communication is also a key component of any re-
election strategy. In order to maximise the return of their electorally
oriented activities, MPs purposefully put emphasis on the communication
of specific policy areas. In this sense, saliency and credibility are the two
important factors. First, the electoral benefit of involvement in a policy
area depends on its saliency among constituents (Saalfeld, 2003, p. 76).
Hence, communicating issues that matter to their constituents can be a
rational strategy. Saliency increases the potential votes that MPs can culti-
vate by being involved in an issue area because constituents are more
likely to base their voting preferences on the particular issue areas that
matter to them the most.
Second, although MPs are free to choose any issue to communicate to their
constituents, their choices need to be perceived as credible to maximise their
re-election prospects. Credibility is important because, for instance, ‘[f]or a
voter lacking an easy way to sort out valid from invalid claims the sensible
recourse is skepticism’ (Mayhew, 1974, p. 60). Besides, politicians, to say
the least, are often not the most trusted individuals. However, Mayhew
(1974, pp. 81–105) argues that the organisation of legislators in ‘salient struc-
tural units’ such as committees and parties increases the credibility of their
communications. For example, while any MP can claim credit for a bridge
built in their constituency, it might increase the credibility of this claim if
an MP is a member of a committee in charge of infrastructure or a party in
government. The more credible the constituents find a claim, in return, the
more effective their communication will be to contribute towards their re-
election.
Against this background, the following subsections therefore develop two
sets of hypotheses based on the salience of EU affairs and credibility of
MPs in these affairs.
Salience of EU affairs
A first set of theoretical expectations is related to the salience of EU affairs.
Most EU issues have limited salience among European citizens (Moravcsik,
2002). So much so that Europeans do not vote primarily on EU affairs even
in elections to the European Parliament (Hix & Marsh, 2007, 2011; Reif &
Schmitt, 1980). Despite its increasing influence on vote choice in national
elections (De Vries, 2007, 2010), the degree of EU issue salience remains
lower than most other issues. For example, on average, only 3 per cent of
the electorate in the UK saw the EU as the most important issue facing
their country between October 2014 and January 2015 (Ipsos MORI, 2015)
– the period of analysis in this paper.
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The low salience makes the personal involvement in communicating EU
affairs relatively less beneficial for MPs seeking re-election. Indeed, it is
argued elsewhere that MPs consider EU affairs as an electorally unrewarding
area (Pollak & Slominski, 2014; Saalfeld, 2003). Rational MPs would be better
off focusing their electorally motivated communication activities in another
policy area with higher saliency among the voters, depending on the safety
of their seat. As the electoral safety of a seat decreases, each vote becomes
more critical for MPs. Empirical analyses of legislative behaviour repeatedly
show that MPs who only marginally won the previous election concentrate
on their re-election seeking activities more than the others (Cain et al.,
1987; Gaines, 1998; Heitshusen, Young, & Wood, 2005; Norton & Wood,
1993). As marginal MPs are more likely to avoid low salience issues, I
expect that the communication of EU affairs is disproportionately left to elec-
torally safer MPs.
H1: The higher the electoral safety of their seat, the more likely MPs are to com-
municate EU affairs.
Seniority in parliament is likely to create a similar effect because electoral
insecurity is felt most strongly among the newly elected legislators (Fenno,
1978; Norton & Wood, 1993). As the opportunity to build a personal repu-
tation with their voters increases with time, senior MPs benefit electorally
from being in parliament longer than their junior colleagues. This decreases
the need to avoid communicating low salience issues such as EU affairs for
re-election seeking MPs.
H2: The longer the incumbency of MPs, the more likely they are to communi-
cate EU affairs.
The general low salience of EU affairs is the norm among European politi-
cal parties, leaving the ownership of the issue to Eurosceptic parties. Studies
show that European elites (Müller, Jenny, & Ecker, 2012) and more specifi-
cally mainstream political parties (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Mattila &
Raunio, 2006) support European integration more than their voters do in
most EU member states. Besides, parties are often internally divided over
the EU (Hix, 1999). Therefore, the communication of EU affairs carries a
high risk of sounding disagreeable to voters and party leaders. It would be a
safer choice for most MPs to talk about the traditional issues that make
their parties mainstream in the first place.
For MPs from Eurosceptic parties, however, this creates an electoral oppor-
tunity. As the mainstream parties try to avoid communicating about the EU,
there emerges a gap for parties which are better aligned with the voters to
capitalise on public Euroscepticism. Eurosceptic parties are particularly suc-
cessful in mobilising the masses around this issue (De Vries & Edwards,
2009), and the election results show that active communication of Eurosceptic
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positions wins votes for these parties (De Vries & Hobolt, 2012). By commu-
nicating EU affairs to their constituents, MPs from Eurosceptic parties can
bring the debate to an area where they would like elections to be fought on.
There they advertise themselves as representatives of the Eurosceptic
public, take pleasing positions for the public to hear, and blame everything
that is wrong on the EU.
H3: The higher the Euroscepticism of their party, the more likely are the MPs to
communicate EU affairs.
Eurosceptic parties can organise the demand for communication of EU
affairs as well, without actually winning any seats. In constituencies that
they unsuccessfully contest, Eurosceptic candidates can nevertheless chal-
lenge the incumbents to address EU affairs. Besides, their Eurosceptic
campaign can increase the salience of these affairs among the voters,
and at the very least their relative electoral success shows incumbents
from other parties how much voter demand there is for EU affairs in
their constituency. Re-election seeking MPs need to be responsive to
the Eurosceptic challengers and the organised interest for EU affairs in
their constituency. Therefore, the incentives for MPs to communicate
EU affairs increase with the electoral challenge of Eurosceptic
competitors.
H4: The higher the electoral challenge of Euroscepticism in their constituency,
the more likely are the MPs to communicate EU affairs.
Credibility of MPs in EU affairs
A second set of theoretical expectations is related to the credibility of MPs in
EU affairs. Legislative power is divided or shared among various actors at
different levels in the EU, making the attribution of responsibility more chal-
lenging than in national politics (Rauh, 2015; Wilson & Hobolt, 2015). While
this might help Eurosceptic MPs to blame the EU for everything, complexity
makes it harder for individual MPs to claim credit for their personal achieve-
ments in the multi-level system. Studies show that ordinary citizens find it
complicated to locate where credit is due in multi-level systems such as the
EU (De Vries, Van der Brug, Van Egmond, & Van der Eijk, 2011; Johns,
2011; for the same finding in other multi-level systems, see also Arceneaux,
2006; Cutler, 2004, 2008). However, ordinary citizens are not alone in being
confused by EU affairs. Saalfeld (2003) argues that responsibility attribution
in the EU is puzzling for MPs as well. Therefore, the problem with the com-
munication of EU affairs is not only that constituents might be indifferent to
or sceptic about what MPs claim as their personal achievements in EU affairs,
but also that MPs may not think there is something to claim for in the first
place.
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The role of ‘salient structural units’ is especially important for MPs’ stra-
tegic choice of communication under these conditions. Units that attribute
responsibility to its members in EU affairs decrease the complexity for both
sides of parliamentary communication. Specifically, MPs from national
parliaments, governing parties, and European affairs committees are
more likely to communicate EU affairs because their position in these
units makes credit claiming a more viable option for them. These MPs
can ‘make things happen and be perceived to make things happen’
(Mayhew, 1974, p. 92) in EU affairs. Therefore, they have an advantage
over MPs from regional parliaments, opposition parties, or other commit-
tees, whose options are rather limited to advertising, position taking, or
blaming.
Between the different levels of parliaments as units, national parliaments
have undoubtedly a larger responsibility than regional parliaments in EU
affairs. Following a gradual increase in their rights and duties over time, the
Treaty of Lisbon further strengthened the role of national parliaments to par-
ticipate in EU decision-making. National parliaments can now intervene in
the European legislative process through the early warning mechanism
(EWM), which makes them one of the most important actors in EU affairs
(Cooper, 2012). However, the same cannot be said about regional parlia-
ments, which have a much more limited role in EU affairs. For example,
the same treaty leaves it to national parliaments to decide whether it is appro-
priate to consult regional parliaments in the context of the EWM. Therefore,
the attribution of responsibility in EU affairs exists more clearly for members
of national parliaments than regional parliaments.
H5: National MPs are more likely to communicate EU affairs than regional
MPs.
Multi-level politics benefits the governments, which increase their power as
opposed to legislatures (Putnam, 1988). This is especially true in the EU
(Moravcsik, 1994), where the governments define the policy agenda and nego-
tiate the division of jurisdictional competencies. Furthermore, ministers of
national and – under certain conditions – regional governments form one
of the two chambers in the EU besides the European Parliament. As a
result, government parties have an advantage over the opposition in EU
affairs in terms of information and power (Schmidt, 2006, p. 64), and they
have a larger responsibility that comes with this advantage. For opposition
MPs without such responsibility, credible communication options are
limited to advertising, position taking, and blaming, while MPs from the gov-
erning parties can also more credibly claim credit in EU affairs.
H6: MPs from governing parties are more likely to communicate EU affairs
than MPs from opposition parties.
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Finally, irrespective of their parliamentary level or political party, one
group of MPs who have clear responsibility in EU affairs are the members
of committees in charge of EU issues. Both national parliaments (Bergman,
1997; Maurer & Wessels, 2001; Norton, 1996) and regional parliaments
(Abels, 2013) created special committees to deal with EU politics. They
soon became the main body where parliaments exercise their constitutionally
secured rights in the EU. As parliamentary rights and duties have included
scrutiny of more documents from more policy areas, their resources and
thus capabilities have also improved over time. Besides documents, the
majority of European affairs committees became active in scrutinising
members of governments before and after European Council meetings as
well (Raunio, 2005; Raunio & Hix, 2000; Saalfeld, 2005). As a result, Schnei-
der, Rittberger, and Wonka (2014) show that members of these committees
are more likely to be involved in activities related to EU affairs in German
regional parliaments. I expect to find a similar effect of committee member-
ship on the communication of EU affairs.
H7: Members of European affairs committees are more likely to communicate
EU affairs than non-member MPs.
Case selection, data, and methods
In order to test the hypotheses above, I analysed the messages posted on
Twitter by MPs from Dáil Éireann, the House of Commons, Scottish Parlia-
ment, National Assembly for Wales, and the Northern Ireland Assembly
between the beginning of October 2014 and the end of January 2015. This
case selection brings together similar parliaments in terms of overall institu-
tionalisation and their role in EU affairs, but at the same time it provides suf-
ficient variation in terms of key variables such as levels of Euroscepticism or
voting systems.
These five parliaments are from two EU member states, Ireland and the
UK, which ‘share a common political origin and each remains broadly
representative of the Westminster model’ (Heitshusen et al., 2005, p. 34).
This helps keep several factors constant, including the importance of
social media as a channel between representatives and the represented.
They also share the language. This allows all parliaments to be analysed
with a single dictionary of keywords in English instead of multiple diction-
aries, which avoids potential validity issues. Furthermore, the national par-
liaments in Ireland and the UK rank close together roughly in the middle of
all other parliaments with regard to their role in EU affairs, such as control-
ling their governments in EU affairs (Auel, Rozenberg, & Tacea, 2015;
Karlas, 2012; Winzen, 2012) or being involved in the transposition of EU
directives (Sprungk, 2013). Although there is no such data at the regional
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level, the selection of regional parliaments from the same member state to
some extent controls for possible variation in their role. Finally, the case
selection allows the chosen time frame to cover a non-electoral period for
all parliaments under analysis. This ensures that the results are not affected
by an election at any level of representation in the EU.
Despite these helpful similarities, there is a useful variation in the variables
of interest. First, the level of Euroscepticism varies among the regional parlia-
ments as well as between the national ones. The latest Eurobarometer (2016)
opinion poll shows that Ireland has the most positive view of the Union
among its 28 members while the UK has the fourth most negative. Likewise,
the Brexit referendum exposed a division between the areas represented by the
regional parliaments: Wales voted (53 per cent) to leave, but Northern Ireland
(56 per cent) and Scotland (62 per cent) voted to remain. Second, the case
selection includes all three main types of electoral system: first-past-the-
post (FPTP) in the UK, single-transferable vote (STV) in Ireland and North-
ern Ireland, and mixed-member systems in Scotland and Wales. Therefore, a
further variation of voting systems also exists within Scotland and Wales –
FPTP and closed-list proportional representation (PR).
Table 1 provides the summary statistics on variables used in the analysis.1 I
obtained the majority of the data on independent variables from the official
websites of the parliaments, political parties, and individual MPs themselves.
These include binary variables to indicate whether MPs are the members of
national parliaments (National Parliament) in the UK (United Kingdom),
parties in regional or national government (Government Party), or the com-
mittees in charge of EU affairs (EU Committee) in these parliaments; and
whether they are female (Female MPs). Also from the same data sources
are the count variables for number of parliamentarians elected from a given
Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std deviation Minimum Maximum
All Tweets (Exposure) 492.85 670.58 1 6138
EU-related Tweets 10.89 22.43 0 278
Electoral Safety 0.96 0.79 0 2
Seniority 10.29 7.24 0 45
Eurosceptic Party 3.10 1.41 1.29 6.86
Eurosceptic Challenge 2.26 3.20 0 38.7
National Parliament 0.73 0.45 0 1
Government Party 0.58 0.49 0 1
EU Committee 0.05 0.22 0 1
FPTP 0.69 0.46 0 1
STV 0.24 0.43 0 1
District Magnitude 2.27 2.04 1 7
EU Dissent 4.28 2.06 0.71 7.29
Age 52.41 10.32 24 81
Female MPs 0.27 0.44 0 1
United Kingdom 0.85 0.36 0 1
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district (District Magnitude), MPs’ age (Age) and the number of years of
service as parliamentarians (Seniority) as of 2015.
The parliamentary websites also provided the data on election results. To
code Electoral Safety across different electoral systems, the seats are ranked
as marginal (0), competitive (1), and safe (2) according to the results from
the most recent elections. Eurosceptic Challenge is based on the vote share
of parliaments’ most Eurosceptic party. Voting System indicates whether
MPs are elected under closed-list PR, FPTP, or STV systems. Finally, the
two variables on party positioning on European integration – Eurosceptic
Party and EU Dissent – are based on the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey
(Bakker et al., 2015). Eurosceptic Party denotes the position of the party
that MPs are a member of, ranging from strongly favours (1) to strongly
opposes (7) European integration. EU Dissent measures the degree of
dissent on European integration within their party, ranging from completely
united parties (0) to extremely divided parties (10).
The data for the dependent variable (EU-related Tweets) come from MPs’
messages posted on Twitter. Legislative studies of this particular social media
channel have, so far, largely focused on legislators’ Twitter presence and
activity around electoral campaigns (for extensive reviews, see Jungherr,
2014, 2016). Early studies found that legislators’ party membership, age,
gender, and seniority determine who uses Twitter and how often (Jackson
& Lilleker, 2011; Lassen & Brown, 2011; Hemphill, Otterbacher, & Shapiro,
2013; Peterson, 2012). More recent research on the members of the European
Parliament (MEPs), moreover, shows that voting systems, district magnitude,
and seat safety are also important factors (Obholzer & Daniel, 2016; Scherper-
eel, Wohlgemuth, & Schmelzinger, 2016); presence and activity on Twitter
increase with the incentives that these factors create for individual legislators
to cultivate a personal vote. With regard to the content, Twitter seems to
mimic legislative communication practices in both form and substance,
where legislators ‘broadcast’ their typical messages to voters in a way that
leaves very little room for interactive communication (Golbeck, Grimes, &
Rogers, 2010; Hemphill et al., 2013; Jackson & Lilleker, 2011; Sæbø, 2011).
If MPs’ communicative behaviour on Twitter is similar to their behaviour
elsewhere, as the literature suggests, Twitter data can provide opportunities to
go beyond analysing the legislative attitude toward social media – a path that
the existing literature is yet to develop. In this sense, although Twitter is only
one of many channels of communication available to legislators, we can
analyse their tweets to understand their strategic behaviour toward communi-
cation in general. Indeed, Twitter has quickly become an important platform
for political communication in less than a decade since its appearance (Nagler
& Tucker, 2015). For example, the websites of all five parliaments in this study
provide the usernames of their members with a Twitter account, a sign that
Twitter has established itself as a communication channel for MPs in
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Ireland and the UK. From these websites, I retrieved the usernames of the
existing MPs on 30 September 2014. I then collected the tweets from these
usernames for the period between 1 October 2014 and 31 January 2015
through Twitter’s application programming interface (API).2
I developed a three-step method to find the tweets that communicated EU
affairs.3 First, benefiting from a comprehensive glossary dedicated to EU ter-
minology (www.euabc.com), I created a dictionary of EU keywords. Table A1
in the appendix provides this dictionary. I then automatically located the
tweets that had at least one word in common with it. The dictionary was lib-
erally put together in the sense that it included keywords that may – but do
not necessarily have to – be related to EU affairs in order to increase the like-
lihood of catching all EU-related communication. For example, the keyword
Brussels returned, among others, the following two tweets:
Brussels targets Amazon’s Luxembourg tax deal
—Stewart Stevenson, Member of the Scottish Parliament, 7 October 2014
Back home from Brussels. Even in the rain Dublin is so beautiful. #LoveDublin
—Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Member of Dáil Éireann, 11 December 2014
In total, the dictionary method returned 23,648 tweets. However, because
of the risk that the keywords might be used in contexts (Nagler & Tucker,
2015) other than EU politics, I read and manually coded all of these
tweets in the second step. To continue with the above example, I coded
the former as ‘1’ because it is related to EU affairs where Brussels refers to
the EU institutions. However, I coded the latter as ‘0’ because here Brussels
refers to the city and the message is not about EU affairs. To test the inter-
subjective replicability of this manual coding process, a second researcher
coded a sample of these tweets. The results had scores well above acceptable
standards in various tests. As a final step, to test the validity of the diction-
ary, I randomly selected and coded further tweets that the dictionary did not
catch, taking the total number of manually coded tweets to 26,000. Out of
these randomly chosen 2352 tweets, only five were about EU affairs.
Further details on the replicability and validity tests as well as the codebook
can also be found in the appendix.
Results
Figure 1 visualises the MPs’ use of Twitter by parliament. Out of 1109 MPs
serving in the five parliaments on 30 September 2014, 868 MPs (78.3 per
cent) had an account on Twitter and 841 of them (75.8 per cent) actively
used their accounts in the sense that they tweeted at least once between 1
October 2014 and 31 January 2015.4 These numbers refer to a massive
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increase in the popularity of Twitter as a communication channel for MPs in a
short period of time. For example, in the House of Commons, compared with
June 2009 when only 51 MPs actively used Twitter (Jackson & Lilleker, 2011),
its popularity increased more than eightfold in just over five years.
MPs posted 414,490 messages, averaging 492.8 tweets per user, within the
four-month period. In other words, MPs tweeted roughly four times per day
on average. Figure 2 plots this data and shows that the most noticeable differ-
ences were among individual members of each parliament as well as between
the parliaments of the two countries. To start with the latter, the Dáil Éireann
and the House of Commons feature at the opposite ends of the figure, demon-
strating the effect of country-level factors on the overall level of activity on
Twitter. However, the level of parliament seems unrelated. The National
Assembly for Wales and the Scottish Parliament are not far behind the
House of Commons in second position, followed by the Northern Ireland
Assembly. When it comes to individual members, the differences were even
clearer. There were some very active MPs on Twitter compared with their col-
leagues in each parliament, with the most active MP being from the House of
Figure 1. Percentage of MPs active on Twitter.
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Commons: George Galloway with 6138 messages in total or 49.9 tweets posted
per day in the period analysed.
The automated search of the database against the dictionary resulted in
23,648 tweets that included at least one of the keywords. However, the
manual coding found that only 9160 tweets were about EU affairs whereas
the remaining 14,498 tweets were not. Therefore, 2.2 per cent of all tweets
were EU-related. In comparison with the findings from other channels of
communication (Auel, 2015), this is slightly higher than the share of EU
affairs in oral questions (1.67 per cent) but considerably less than the hours
of debates (7.2 per cent) in parliaments.
Summing up the EU-related tweets for each MP, Figure 3 demonstrates
how the number and percentage of EU-related tweets vary by parliament.
Unlike the overall numbers, the figures for the EU-related tweets show a
difference between national and regional parliaments. This means that MPs
from national parliaments tweet more about the EU both in absolute
numbers and as a percentage of their overall number of tweets. The upper
quartile and maximum are higher for the Dáil Éireann than for the House
Figure 2. Twitter activity by parliament.
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of Commons. This provides descriptive support for the hypothesis that the
level of parliament matters for the communication of EU affairs, where the
MPs from national parliaments are more likely than their colleagues from
regional parliaments to communicate EU politics.
The descriptive results also provide face validity for the methods used to
identify the EU-related messages. This is indicated by the fact that the
‘leaders’ in the figure, both (Figure 3(A)) the MP with the highest number
and (Figure 3(B)) the one with the highest share of EU-related tweets, are
among the usual suspects. The highest number belongs to Douglas Carswell,
the first MP in the House of Commons to represent the Eurosceptic United
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), with 278 EU-related messages in
four months. Percentagewise, however, with 80 per cent of all tweets being
about the EU, it is Bill Cash, who is not only a prominent Eurosceptic MP
but also the chair of the House of Commons’ European Scrutiny Committee.
On average, MPs posted 10.9 EU-related messages on Twitter during the
period under analysis. However, there was a large variance, with a standard
deviation of 22.4 tweets. For example, besides the top-end outliers mentioned
above, there were also others who seemed not to be interested in communi-
cating EU affairs; 178 MPs (21.2 per cent) did not post a single message
about EU affairs between 1 October 2014 and 31 January 2015.
How did the communication of EU affairs unfold over the period under
analysis? Figure 4 plots the average number of EU-related tweets posted by
the MPs in each parliament. It shows that EU affairs never completely disap-
pear from the agenda of MPs, even during Christmas and the holiday season
around weeks 51 and 52. Parliament-specific ups and downs, however, are
prominent in the data. For example, the average number of EU-related
tweets peaked among the members of the House of Commons during week
43. This week saw the plenary debate of the second reading of the European
Union (Referendum) Bill 2014–15, which led to widespread discussion of the
EU.
Figure 3. EU-related Twitter activity by parliament.
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Content of the EU-related tweets
Over 6 per cent of all EU-related tweets indeed included the keyword referen-
dum, the third most common after MEP (9.7 per cent) and TTIP (8.9 per
cent). In fact, the most prominent keywords were all among the relatively
salient aspects of EU affairs. Figure 5 demonstrates the prominence of
keyword categories5 in EU-related tweets. It suggests that most of the EU-
related tweets were about policies. Beside the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership (TTIP), controversial trade negotiations between the EU
and US during the period under analysis, MPs posted a considerable
number of messages about free movement and agriculture among the other
policies in this category. Next was the category of keywords related to
country-specific aspects of EU affairs, including the then upcoming UK refer-
endum on EU membership or Ireland’s bailout by the EU. Albeit to a lesser
extent, MPs were also interested in affairs in other EU member states, such
as the government-debt crisis in Greece. As the figure shows, the regional par-
liaments’ share of EU-related tweets is the smallest in this category, suggesting
Figure 4. Weekly average of EU-related tweets.
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that regional MPs are less likely to communicate country-specific EU affairs
out of other categories.
The third category of tweets was about EU politicians, most notably the
MEPs. There was some evidence of party-political communication in these
tweets, where MPs promoted the MEPs from their own party or criticised
the others. For example, several such messages unfavourably portrayed the
MEPs from UKIP – the UK’s Eurosceptic challenger party with a significantly
larger presence in the European Parliament than in regional or national par-
liaments. Keywords for the European Commissioners as well as the presidents
of the EU institutions were also prominent in this category, but surprisingly
only seven tweets were about the outgoing and incoming presidents of the
European Council – Herman Van Rompuy and Donald Tusk – suggesting
a low relevance of this post in the eyes of the MPs. Within the final category
of keywords for EU institutions, the European Commission attracted by far
the largest share (3.2 per cent) of references, followed by the European
Central Bank (0.5 per cent). The latter was especially salient for the Irish
MPs, due primarily to the role of the Bank in the bailout programme.
Figure 5. Keywords in EU-related tweets.
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Nevertheless, the share of EU-related tweets by regional MPs was the highest
in this category, with almost a third of all tweets about EU institutions coming
from the regional level.
A qualitative reading of a sample of EU-related tweets suggests that, for
many MPs, the area of EU affairs is rather unsuitable for claiming credit.
Out of 100 randomly chosen tweets about EU affairs, only nine conveyed
credit-claiming messages. Other types of electorally oriented activity had sig-
nificantly higher and somewhat similar shares. Position taking was the most
popular activity, and 35 tweets communicated where MPs stood on various
issues in EU affairs. Advertising was closely behind; 33 tweets were posted
to promote MPs themselves, their colleagues, or parties. The remaining 23
messages were shifting the blame in EU affairs on to other actors. Compara-
tively, therefore, credit claiming as an electorally oriented activity was found
in only a minority of messages about EU affairs. Overall, the content of the
EU-related tweets provides support for the effect of saliency and credibility
on strategic communication.
Determinants of communicating EU affairs
Based on the share of EU-related messages within the overall number of
tweets per MP, this article presents an analysis of the determinants of commu-
nicating EU affairs using negative binomial regressions with a control for
exposure time. Negative binomial regression stands out as the appropriate
model because: (1) the dependent variable is a count variable; (2) the variance
is well above the mean number of EU-related tweets; and (3) there was no sep-
arate process creating the zero counts.6 However, as is evident from the large
variance in total number of tweets (see Table 1, All Tweets), MPs do not spend
an equal amount of time on Twitter. This necessitates adding All Tweets to the
regression models as exposure time – an offset variable used in count models
to adjust for such variances (Hilbe, 2011) – in order to control for the fact that
MPs who used Twitter frequently had more time to tweet about EU affairs as
well. Essentially, the use of exposure time turns the models into rate models,
allowing us to analyse the proportional differences in prioritising the com-
munication of EU affairs among all the other issues.
Table 2 presents the results in two models based on different interpret-
ations of Electoral Safety, both providing support for the hypotheses. In
Model 1, where it is treated as a continuous variable, the results show that
Electoral Safety significantly increases MPs’ communication of EU affairs.
Model 2 provides a further test for the effect of Electoral Safety by including
a fixed effect for each coding category. It demonstrates that the positive and
significant effect found in Model 1 is driven by completely safe seats. More
specifically, a change from a marginal to a safe seat increases the expected
share of EU-related tweets by 30.3 per cent. The change from a marginal to
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competitive seats increases the expected share by 20.4 per cent, but this
increase is not statistically significant. Overall, both models confirm Hypoth-
esis 1, that the communication of low salience issues such as EU affairs
increases with electoral safety. Indeed, MPs are significantly more likely to
communicate EU affairs when they feel completely safe in their seats.
Seniority provides further evidence for the electoral connection of MPs’
strategic approach to communication. Everything else – including their elec-
toral marginality – being equal, senior MPs allow themselves to communicate
EU affairs significantly more than do their junior colleagues in parliament.
According to the models in Table 2, every year an MP serves in parliament
leads to a 2 per cent increase in the expected rate of EU-related tweets. In
line with the theory that long-term incumbency creates a different source
of electoral safety, Seniority decreases the need to be involved in electorally
oriented activities such as prioritising the communication of high-salience
issues instead of EU affairs (H2).
What happens if these issues have high saliency for the MPs’ political
party? The results show that, in the case of the MPs from Eurosceptic
parties, it affects strategic communication positively. According to Model
Table 2. Negative binomial estimates and percentage change in expected count for EU-
related tweets.
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Standard error % Coefficient Standard error %
Electoral Safety 0.134** 0.050 14.3
Competitive 0.186 0.099 20.4
Safe 0.264** 0.100 30.3
Seniority 0.020** 0.007 2.0 0.020** 0.007 2.0
Eurosceptic Party 0.159** 0.050 17.2 0.160** 0.050 17.4
Eurosceptic Challenge 0.034* 0.014 3.4 0.033* 0.014 3.4
National Parliament 0.595*** 0.146 81.4 0.597*** 0.146 81.7
Government Party 0.289** 0.101 33.4 0.285** 0.101 32.9
EU Committee 1.011*** 0.183 174.8 1.012*** 0.183 175.0
Voting System
FPTP –0.238 0.581 –21.2 –0.260 0.582 –22.9
STV –0.692 0.404 –49.9 –0.729 0.408 –51.8
District Magnitude 0.026 0.101 2.7 0.022 0.102 2.2
EU Dissent –0.068 0.041 –6.6 –0.068 0.041 –6.6
Age 0.011* 0.005 1.1 0.011* 0.005 1.1
Female MPs –0.304*** 0.089 –26.2 –0.309*** 0.089 –26.6
United Kingdom –0.521 0.442 –40.6 –0.520 0.441 –40.6
Constant –4.880*** 0.618 n.a. –4.872*** 0.618 n.a.
N 751 751
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of EU-related tweets posted by MPs. Both models estimated
via negative binomial regression. % denotes percentage change in expected count for unit increase in
independent variables. Exposure is set to All Tweets with its coefficient constrained to be unity. PR is the
excluded category of Voting System in both models, and Marginal is the excluded category of Electoral
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2, every unit on the scale of Euroscepticism is associated with a 17.4 per
cent increase in the expected share of EU-related messages. This confirms
the hypothesis that supply-side salience contributes to the communication
of EU affairs by Eurosceptic MPs (H3). Figure 6 visualises the effects of
Euroscepticism, showing that the communication of EU affairs more than
doubles between the extremes of the scale: while MPs from parties that
are strongly in favour of the European integration are predicted to post
roughly nine EU-related messages in four months, this number is about
22 messages for MPs who are members of parties that strongly oppose
the integration.
The varying levels of demand affect the strategic communication in the
same way, indicated by the positive and significant coefficient for Eurosceptic
Challenge. For every percentage of vote share achieved by their Eurosceptic
competitors, MPs are predicted to post 3.4 per cent more EU-related messages
on Twitter. This provides further support for the overall argument that issue
saliency is a strong determinant of legislative communication strategies.
Next, turning to the three binary variables concerning the credibility of
MPs (H5–H7), the results demonstrate that National Parliament, Government
Party, and EU Committee are all significant predictors of communicating EU
affairs. MPs from these units are expected to post significantly higher pro-
portions of messages related to EU affairs on Twitter. Among the three,
Figure 6. Predicted number of EU-related tweets.
Notes: The figure is based on Model 2. All other variables held at their median (ordinal) or mean (continu-
ous) values.
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being a member of the committee in charge of EU affairs looms large as being
the strongest predictor. Continuing with Model 2, this increases the expected
rate of EU-related messages by 175 per cent compared with the members of
other committees. Similarly, national MPs post 81.7 per cent more EU-related
messages than regional MPs. There is a relatively smaller but nonetheless sig-
nificant effect of being a member of the parties in government, which
increases the rate of EU-related tweets by 32.9 per cent compared with the
MPs from opposition parties.
These results hold in the presence of the control variables typical to the
studies of legislative behaviour. Among these covariates, this study finds
MPs’ age and gender to be significant factors behind their strategic com-
munication of EU affairs. On average, being a year older increases the
expected rate of EU-related messages by 1.1 per cent. Given that age is
the single most important reason for not seeking re-election (Byrne &
Theakston, 2015), one could argue that older MPs are less concerned
with losing their seats and therefore that they can allow themselves to com-
municate low salient affairs as well. With respect to gender, female MPs are
expected to post a 27.1 per cent smaller share of tweets on EU affairs. This
is in line with the finding that female legislators are less likely to claim credit
for personal achievements in general and especially so in policy issues
(Fridkin & Kenney, 2014). On the contrary, other covariates such Voting
System, District Magnitude, or EU Dissent do not have a statistically signifi-
cant effect on the outcome.
Conclusion
This paper has extended the empirical evidence on parliamentary communi-
cation of EU affairs to individual-level legislative behaviour on social media
among the members of not only national but also regional parliaments.
Based on the argument that MPs are strategic about their communication
choices, it has questioned the suitability of EU affairs to re-election strategies.
As a significant portion of communication between representatives and the
represented takes place outside the formal channels, it is important to
analyse alternative channels of communication such as the social media.
Drawing on close to half a million tweets posted by regional and national
MPs from Ireland and the UK during a four-month period, this study found
that only 2.2 per cent of the messages were about EU affairs. The multivariate
analysis provided insights into why the communication of EU affairs might
take up as little as a few per cent of overall parliamentary communication.
The communication of EU affairs increases with electoral safety and seniority
in parliament. Also contributing to the EU debate are the MPs who are from
Eurosceptic parties or otherwise, who are electorally challenged by the candi-
dates from these parties. This suggests that issue salience, on both the supply
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and demand sides, is an important factor explaining who communicates EU
affairs. The other factor that stands out is the responsibility in EU affairs. MPs
with clearer attribution of responsibility – due to their membership of insti-
tutions such as national parliaments, governing parties, or EU committees
– communicate EU affairs more often. The problem is that it is often difficult,
more difficult than it is in regional or national affairs, to attribute responsibil-
ity in EU affairs for both MPs and their constituents.
These results support the theoretical arguments that: (1) MPs choose what
they communicate to voters strategically; and (2) salience and complexity of
political affairs might affect the way individual MPs settle their strategy. Pol-
itically, this implies that Euroscepticism might be dominating the parliamen-
tary communication of EU affairs. European citizens receive
disproportionately negative views of the EU from their parliamentary repre-
sentatives. This implication rests on the assumption that MPs from Euroscep-
tic parties tally with the party line. Further research could test this assumption
by analysing the positions that MPs take in EU affairs.
Finally, this study provides evidence from only two EU member states and
one communication channel. The parliaments in Ireland and the UK are
similar in many aspects, contributing to the internal and external validity of
the results presented here. Furthermore, Twitter is a suitable choice as well
because it is an increasingly popular communication channel where we can
observe strategic choices of individual MPs. However, there are several
other channels of communication available to MPs in different member
states. Do the results presented in this paper hold in other member states
or communication channels as well? Further research could broaden our
understanding beyond these limits.
Notes
1. A detailed codebook for these variables can be found in the appendix.
2. Twitter’s API returns up to 3200 of the most recent tweets of a user. Not to
lose any tweets of very active MPs who could go beyond this limit in four
months, I collected the data in two instalments, on 1 December 2014 and
1 February 2015.
3. Note that this method analyses only the text internal to the tweets themselves,
and excludes any URLs that might be attached to link the reader to an external
source.
4. A large majority of the dormant 27 accounts had not had a tweet for years, indi-
cating that these MPs stopped using Twitter. Hence I excluded them from the
analysis (for the same practice, see Jackson & Lilleker, 2011).
5. For the complete list of keywords in each category, see Table A1 in the
appendix.
6. Indeed, likelihood ratio tests between the Poisson regression and the negative
binomial regression show that the latter is the more appropriate model for
the data under analysis (LR χ2 = 4236.09, df = 1, Pr > LR χ2 = 0.0000). Likewise,
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Vuong tests suggest that the zero-inflated negative binomial models would not
be an improvement over the standard negative binomial models used here
(z = –0.01, Pr > z = 0.5029). Both results are based on Model 2.
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Appendix
Dictionary of EU keywords and its validity
Table A1 presents the dictionary of EU keywords used as a first step for locating the
EU-related tweets. I took several aspects into account while putting keywords together
to increase the validity of the dictionary and the methods used in this analysis in
general. First, for the draft dictionary, I benefited from a comprehensive glossary pro-
vided by a website dedicated to EU terminology, www.euabc.com.
Table A1. Dictionary of EU keywords.
Country-specific People Institutions Policy
£1.7 @EP_President Brussels Accession
Bailout @FedericaMog Codecision Acquis
Brexit @philhoganeu Comitology Banking union
France Ashton Committee of the Regions CAP
Germany Barroso COREPER CFSP
Greece Commissioner Director-General Court of Auditors Citizens’ initiative
Greek Draghi Democratic deficit Cohesion
Grexit EUHR DG CSDP
In/Out High Representative Directorate-General Customs union
Member state Hogan Double majority Derogation
Referendum Hollande Early warning system Directive
Syriza @jhilleu EC EAW





Rapporteur EUCO Free movement
Schulz EWM Harmonisation
Tusk EWS Immigration
Van Rompuy Intergovernmental Laeken
QMV Lisbon

















Note: The keyword EU was used both as a standalone acronym, i.e. EU, and as a group of letters, i.e. eu.
I continued to update the dictionary as I learnt from the data while manually
reading the tweets. As Figure A1 shows, almost half of the EU-related tweets
included more than one keyword. Therefore, the data itself was an important
guide for the final version of the dictionary. Last but not the least, I also searched
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the database for any tweet that included the letters e and u together in addition to
the obvious keyword EU. These precautions to put together a valid dictionary seem
to have worked well. As it is mentioned in the main text, a manual coding of a
random sample of 2352 tweets that the dictionary did not catch found only five
further EU-related tweets.
Intersubjective replicability (inter-coder reliability)
Content analysis methods require reliability tests, especially where there is more than
one coder working on the same data. Although I was the sole coder of the data, I fol-
lowed this scientific practice to test for intersubjective replicability, that is, to see
whether my decisions in the manual coding phase were objective enough. For this
task, I randomly chose 500 messages (2.1 per cent) among the manually coded
tweets, and asked a second researcher to code these tweets based on the following
codebook. The second coder was a PhD candidate with research interests in EU poli-
tics and experience in content analysis. The training – which included explanations of
the overall project, coding instructions for tweets, and the dictionary – was very brief
and lasted less than 30 minutes.
The results were higher than acceptable standards in various tests. Table A2 pre-
sents the coding decisions. Out of 500 cases, there were only 19 disagreements
between the coders, which results in 96.2 per cent agreement. This equals 0.92 as
Scott’s Pi, Cohens Kappa, or Krippendorff’s Alpha (nominal).
Figure A1. Number of keywords in EU-related tweets.
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Table A2. Coding decisions.
Coder 1 Coder 2
Yes No Total
Yes 182 13 195
No 6 299 305
Total 188 312 500
Because the disagreements did not point to systematic inconsistencies, I used the
original coding for the statistical analysis presented in the main text.
The codebook of variables
Dependent variable
EU-related Tweets is a count variable, indicating the number of EU-related
messages that MPs posted on Twitter between 1 October 2014 and 31 January
2015. First, to decide whether a tweet was EU-related (coded as 1) or not
(coded as 0), the instructions below were followed. Second, for each MP, the
scores from their individual tweets were counted to create the dependent
variable.
Coding instructions for tweets
The messages you are about to code are from a sample of tweets posted by regional
and national members of parliaments from Ireland and the United Kingdom between
1 October 2014 and 31 January 2015. These tweets are sampled because they contain
one or more of the keywords in Table A1.
Code only the text internal to the tweets themselves, and ignore the URLs that
might be present in the tweets to link the reader to an external source.
Code a message as 1 if:
1. it is about a person in their capacity as an EU official.
Example: I think Barroso tried to rule out budget freeze.
and/or
2. it is about EU institutions.
Example: ECB may make weaker states bear more QE risks.
and/or
3. it is about EU policies.
Example: Today’s immigration figures prove why we should remove free move-
ment of labour and replace with proper controlled visa system.
Code all the other messages as 0.
Independent variables
Electoral Safety
An ordinal variable measuring the safety of parliamentary seats for legislators,
coded as 0 for Marginal, as 1 for Competitive, or as 2 for Safe seats, after ranking
and dividing the seats into three in each parliament (for single-member districts)
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or in each district (for multi-member districts) according to the results from the most
recent elections: 2010 for the House of Commons and 2011 for the rest of the parlia-
ments, unless there was a by-election for individual cases. This three-category, ordinal
coding of the election results as Electoral Safety is based on the coding scheme devel-
oped by Heitshusen et al. (2005).
For the seats in single-member districts (all seats in the House of Commons; con-
stituency seats in the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales), the
coding is based on the difference between the vote shares of the incumbent MP
and the candidate who came second in the most recent elections. The seats are
coded as Marginal if this difference is smaller than 10 per cent, as Competitive if it
is between 10 and 20 per cent, and as Safe if it is higher than 20 per cent.
For the seats in closed-list PR districts (regional seats in the Scottish Parliament
and National Assembly for Wales), the coding is based on relative list placement of
incumbent MPs, i.e. whether they are at the bottom (Marginal), top (Safe), or in
between (Competitive) the two on their elected party list.
For the seats in districts with single-transferable vote (the Dáil Éireann and North-
ern Ireland Assembly), the coding in based on the first-preference votes of incumbent
MPs. The seats are coded as Marginal if their first-preference vote is less than 60 per
cent of the district’s quota, as Competitive if it is between 60 and 120 per cent, and as
Safe if it is higher than 120 per cent.
Seniority
A continuous variable based on the number of years that MPs had served as par-
liamentary representatives in 2015.
Eurosceptic Party
An ordinal variable measuring the overall position of the party leadership towards
European integration in 2014, coded from 1 for strongly in favour to 7 for strongly
opposed. As mentioned in the text, this variable is based on the 2014 Chapel Hill
Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015).
Eurosceptic Challenge
A continuous variable measuring the vote share of parliaments’ most Eurosceptic
party (regional seats in the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales) or
their candidates (all other seats) in the most recent elections: 2010 for the House of
Commons and 2011 for the rest of the parliaments, unless there was a by-election
for individual cases. Based on the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al.,
2015), these parties are UKIP for the regional and national parliaments in the UK
and the Socialist Party (Páirtí Sóisialach) for the Irish Dáil Éireann. For the seats
under single-transferable vote (all seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly and Dáil
Éireann), this variable indicates the share of first-preference votes. For the seats not
contested by these parties, this variable is coded as 0.
National Parliament
A binary variable coded as 0 for the MPs in regional parliaments or as 1 for MPs in
national parliaments.
Government Party
A binary variable coded as 0 for the MPs from opposition parties or as 1 for the
MPs from parties in the government at the regional level for the regional MPs or
at the national level for national MPs.
EU Committee
A binary variable, coded as 0 if an MP is not a member of the committee in charge
of overseeing EU affairs, or as 1 if they are. The parliaments in this study, like all the
parliaments in the other EU member states, have developed institutional structures to
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scrutinise EU affairs. Committees in charge of overseeing EU affairs are the Joint
Committee on European Union Affairs (Dáil Éireann), European Scrutiny Committee
(House of Commons), European and External Relations Committee (Scottish Parlia-
ment), Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee (National Assembly for
Wales), and the Committee for the Office of the First and deputy First Minister
(Northern Ireland Assembly).
Voting System
A categorical variable, coded as closed-list proportional representation (PR) for the
regional seats in the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales; as first-
past-the-post (FPTP) for all seats in the House of Commons and the constituency
seats in the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales; and as single-trans-
ferable vote (STV) for the seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly and Dáil Éireann.
District Magnitude
A continuous variable measuring the number of legislative seats allocated in the
district of an MP.
EU Dissent
An ordinal variable measuring the degree of disagreement on European inte-
gration in legislators’ party in 2014, coded as from 0 for completely united to 10
for extremely divided parties. Again, this variable is based on the 2014 Chapel Hill
Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015).
Age
A continuous variable based on the age of MPs in 2015.
Female MPs
A binary variable based on gender, coded as 0 for male MPs or as 1 for female MPs.
United Kingdom
A binary variable coded as 0 for MPs in Ireland or as 1 for MPs in the UK.
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